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I. INTRODUCTION
On December 8, 2005, Cameron Frazier, a high-school student at a
t J.D. candidates, 2009 University of Miami School of Law; Editors of the University of
Miami Law Review. Scott E. Byers would like to thank his parents, Christine and William, and his
wife, Emily. Without them none of this would have been possible. Allison V. Perez thanks her
parents and brother, A.J., for their unconditional support and encouragement. She also wants to
thank Christopher Ramirez, and she deeply appreciates Laura J. Tepich's comments on drafts of
this paper and Laura's wonderful editing skills. The authors would like to thank the University of
Miami School of Law faculty and staff and the person who makes law review fun, Farah
Barquero.
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
Palm Beach County School, refused to stand and recite the Pledge of
Allegiance.' Upon his refusal to stand and recite, a verbal altercation
arose between Frazier and his teacher, Cynthia Alexandre,2 where Alex-
andre "subjected him to ridicule and humiliation, and punished him [for]
his refusal to recite, or stand during, the pledge of allegiance."3 Frazier
explained that he had not stood and taken part in the Pledge since the
sixth grade and that he intended it to remain that way.4 Alexandre
replied, "See your desk? Now look at mine. Big desk, little desk. You
obviously don't know your place in this classroom."' Frazier again
asserted that he did not stand for the flag, but his continued resistance
was countered by the teacher's disgusting remark, "I'm sorry, did you
say you don't stand for the fuckin' flag!"6 "Alexandre then handed Cam-
eron a document with the Palm Beach County School District's logo on
it and told Cameron: 'Read this. Florida state statutes say you may
choose not to say the pledge only by written request by your parent and
you still must stand!'" The statute also requires that each student be
informed, through conspicuous postings, of the right not to participate in
the Pledge if that individual obtains written consent from his or her par-
ent or guardian.8 The teacher told Frazier that, because no written
exemption had been provided by Frazier's parent, he was required to say
the Pledge.9 Alexandre continued her disparagement of Frazier's asser-
tion of his right and proceeded to call Frazier a number of insulting
names, including "disrespectful," "ungrateful," and "un-American."'"
Frazier was then sent to the principal's office where Frazier's mother
was called." The principal told Frazier that his mother had excused him
from the Pledge, but that he would still have to stand.' 2 Frazier "was
then made to sit in the office until the class period was over and was not
allowed to return to the classroom that day."' 3
1. Frazier v. Alexandre, 434 F. Supp. 2d 1350, 1353-54 (S.D. Fla. 2006), affid in part, rev'd
in part sub nom. Frazier v. Winn, 535 F.3d 1279 (11 th Cir. 2008), reh'g en banc denied, 555 F.3d
1292 (11th Cir. 2009).
2. Id. at 1354.
3. First Amended Complaint para. 1, Alexandre, 434 F. Supp. 2d 1350 (No. 05-81142).
4. Id. para. 13.
5. Id. para. 14.
6. Id. para. 17.
7. Id. para. 18.
8. FLA. STAT. § 1003.44(1) (2007).
9. Frazier v. Alexandre, 434 F. Supp. 2d 1350, 1354 (S.D. Fla. 2006), aff'd in part, rev'd in
part sub nom. Frazier v. Winn, 535 F.3d 1279 (11 th Cir. 2008), reh'g en banc denied, 555 F.3d
1292 (11 th Cir. 2009).
10. First Amended Complaint, supra note 3, paras. 20-21.
11. Id. para. 26.
12. Id.
13. Id. para. 27.
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As a result of the incident, Frazier, through his mother and next
friend, brought an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that section
1003.44 of the Florida Statutes violated the First and Fourteenth Amend-
ments to the United States Constitution. 14 Frazier sought declaratory and
injunctive relief based on his belief that "he has been, and will continue
to be, irreparably harmed by his continued punishment and denial of his
constitutional right."
15
In an effort to understand the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals'
panel decision in Frazier v. Winn, 6 this Note will critically analyze the
opinion's use and abuse of the longstanding precedent with regard to the
Pledge, the parental right to control the upbringing of one's child, and
the court's invocation of the overbreadth doctrine.
Part II.A discusses the legislative history of the Florida Pledge stat-
ute at issue in Winn, and Part II.B of this Note discusses the procedural
history of the Winn decision, including the precedent and reasoning used
by the Southern District of Florida and the Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals in reaching their respective opinions. Part III will critically ana-
lyze the Eleventh Circuit's decision, with Part III.A focusing on the
court's interpretation of the statutory language, as well as the construc-
tions advanced by the parties during the litigation. Additionally, Part
III.B challenges the court's decision to distinguish the Supreme Court
case of West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette,17 as well as
the court's abuse of precedent with regard to the parental right to control
upbringing of one's own child, and the interaction of the parental right
with the child's right to freedom of speech. The Eleventh Circuit's deci-
sion is somewhat rectified by Part III.C's discussion of Winn as an over-
breadth challenge; however, the applicability of that doctrine to the
Winn case will be questioned and examined. Part III.D explores the
potential for a circuit split on this issue. Lastly, Part IV concludes that,
because of the Eleventh Circuit opinion's lack of clarity, more cases are
sure to follow in an effort to fully develop this area of the law.
H. FIRST PERIOD: A HISTORY LESSON
A. Knowing Where We Come from To Know Where We Are Going:
The Statute's Language
In 1942, Florida imposed the Pledge of Allegiance upon students.
18
14. Alexandre, 434 F. Supp. 2d at 1353.
15. Id. at 1355.
16. 535 F.3d 1279 (11th Cir. 2008), reh'g en banc denied, 555 F.3d 1292 (11th Cir. 2009).
17. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
18. Scott Travis, Judge: Law Making Pupils Stand for Pledge Is Illegal, ORLANDO SErINEL,
June 2, 2006, at A .
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In 2002, the Florida governor signed the form of this statute that Frazier
would combat in court. 9 This form of the Pledge statute resided in sec-
tion 1003.44(1) of the Florida Statutes and had the title "Patriotic Pro-
grams. '' 2' Frazier attacked subsection (1) of the statute, which in
pertinent part states the following.
Each district school board may adopt rules to require, in all of the
schools of the district, programs of a patriotic nature to encourage
greater respect for the government of the United States and its
national anthem and flag, subject always to other existing pertinent
laws of the United States or of the state .... The pledge of allegiance
to the flag . . . shall be rendered by students standing with the right
hand over the heart. The pledge of allegiance to the flag shall be
recited at the beginning of the day in each public elementary, middle,
and high school in the state. Each student shall be informed by post-
ing a notice in a conspicuous place that the student has the right not
to participate in reciting the pledge. Upon written request by his or
her parent, the student must be excused from reciting the pledge.
When the pledge is given, civilians must show full respect to the flag
by standing at attention, men removing the headdress, except when
such headdress is worn for religious purposes ....
With these words thrusting the conflict forward, litigation began.
B. Learning To Avoid Mistakes from Our History:
Procedural History
1. THE DISTRICT COURT'S DECISION: THE FIRST
CRACK AT THE LESSON
Frazier contended that the Pledge requirements were unconstitu-
tional both on their face and as applied to him. He stated that refusal to
recite the Pledge was due to "his personal political beliefs and convic-
tions. The court heard the case on Florida's motion to dismiss and
Frazier's motion for summary judgment.23 The State's first defense was
that Frazier lacked standing as to the facial challenge. Specifically, the
State argued that the statute was never applied to him because he never
sought the required parental permission.24 The court quickly dismissed
this argument because the State's argument assumed that the parental-
19. See Act of May 16, 2002, § 137, 2002 Fla. Law ch. 387, 207-08 (codified at FLA. STAT.
§ 1003.44 (2007)).
20. FLA. STAT. § 1003.44.
21. Id.
22. Frazier v. Alexandre, 434 F. Supp. 2d 1350, 1352 (S.D. Fla. 2006) (emphasis added),
aff'd in part, rev'd in part sub nom. Frazier v. Winn, 535 F.3d 1279 (11 th Cir. 2008), reh'g en
banc denied, 555 F.3d 1292 (11 th Cir. 2009).
23. Id. at 1357.
24. Id. at 1358.
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consent provision is constitutional. Furthermore, the court focused on
the fact that Frazier was challenging that his constitutional rights were
violated. 25 The court determined that "Frazier suffered injury in fact: he
was removed from the classroom, subjected to verbal castigation by
Alexandre, and was personally subjected to the statute's requirement
that even if he did not recite the pledge, he would have to remain stand-
ing."' 26  Furthermore, the court concluded that Frazier would be
"redressed by a favorable decision," so he therefore had standing to
bring a facial challenge.27
Next, the State argued that Frazier did not have an as-applied chal-
lenge because the statute allows those students excused from the pledge
from having to stand. The State's argument was that the statute's lan-
guage requiring all "civilians" to stand did not require students excused
from the pledge to still stand, but instead made reference to non-military
personnel present to stand.28 Its argument was that civilians were forced
to stand, but that "civilians" did not include students. The court, after
looking to the plain language of the statute, as well as other forms of
statutory construction, concluded that the State's argument would lead to
an absurd result and be in direct conflict with ejusdem generis.2 9 After
denying the State's standing arguments, the court then analyzed Fra-
zier's First Amendment arguments.
The court noted that Frazier was not challenging the authority of
the state to permit the recital of the Pledge in the classrooms or the
substance of the Pledge itself.30 Instead, he "challenges only the author-
ity of the state to override his conscience and compel his participation in
such an exercise. ' 31 The court took the stance that the right involved in
refusing to recite the Pledge belonged to the students. The court inter-
25. Id.
26. Id. at 1359.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 1359-60.
29. Id. at 1360. The court stated,
If the statute only applies to schools, "civilians" would include instructional staff,
administrators, support personnel, cafeteria workers, custodial staff, or school
visitors. Were such the case, the State of Florida would be commanding those
individuals, but not its students, to stand at attention for the pledge recitation.
Students would then possess greater rights than these other individuals. Not only
does that interpretation bring about an absurd result, it also runs afoul of the
ejusdem generis canon of construction ....
Id. Ejusdem generis means that, if an enumeration is followed by a general term, the only
limitation that can be imposed on the general term is some characteristic common to all of the
items mentioned in the enumeration. Harrison v. PPG Indus., Inc., 446 U.S. 578, 588 (1980).
30. Alexandre, 434 F. Supp. 2d at 1363.
31. Id.
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preted West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette31 as the first
case to recognize a "student's right to refrain from pledge participa-
tion."33 Furthermore, the court relied heavily on the decision in Circle
School v. Pappert.34 In Pappert, the school followed a state statute
requiring notification to the parent of any child who refused to pledge
allegiance or salute the flag.35 The Third Circuit struck down the state
statute, stating that the provision would unduly "chill" the rights of the
students. 36 The Third Circuit was afraid that the students would not
exercise their right and beliefs because of fear of their parents being
notified.37 Relying heavily on these two cases, the court recognized the
right as belonging to the student, not the parent. 38 The State attempted to
persuade the court that the right to refuse to recite the Pledge belonged
to the custodial parent and not the child.39 The State argued that the
Supreme Court in Elk Grove Unified School District v. Newdow4 ° held
such a result. The court disagreed with the State's interpretation of
Newdow, and stated that the case "explicitly recognizes that ability of a
student to assert constitutional rights against a third party through an
action filed by the appropriate next friend."4 1
The court went on to recognize that the parents have a fundamental
right to control the upbringing of their children; however, the court
determined that the right does not mean that a parent has to consent to
the exercise of the child's First Amendment right.4" The court acknowl-
edged the parents' right concerning custody, care, nurturing of the child,
as well as the right to direct their education. Ultimately, the court held
that "this right [did] not translate into a requirement that a parent must
32. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
33. Alexandre, 434 F. Supp. 2d at 1363 (emphasis added).
34. 381 F.3d 172 (3d Cir. 2004).
35. Id. at 174.
36. Id. at 181.
37. Id.
38. See Alexandre, 434 F. Supp. 2d at 1365 ("Circle School students were still allowed to
make their own decision whether to recite the pledge, whereas the statute here is more restrictive
in that it robs the student of the right to make an independent decision whether to say the pledge.
Since Barnette, federal courts have established a body of caselaw that irrefutably recognizes the
right of students to remain silent and seated during the pledge."). It is also worth reiterating that
the court already found that the reason Frazier refused to say the Pledge was in response to "his
personal political beliefs and convictions." Id. at 1352 (emphasis added).
39. Id. at 1365-66.
40. 542 U.S. 1 (2004). Newdow involved a case where the non-custodial parent, an atheist,
attempted to challenge the "under god" language of the Pledge, as his child's next friend. Id. at 5.
The court dismissed the case because the father lacked standing as a non-custodial parent because
the mother was granted entitlement to make legal decisions on the daughter's behalf. Id. at 17-18.
41. Alexandre, 434 F. Supp. 2d at 1366. Quoting Newdow, the district court noted that a
potential conflict between parent's rights and student's rights may exist. Id.
42. Id. at 1367-68.
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give prior approval of a child's exercise of First Amendment rights in a
school setting."43 The court held that "Pledge autonomy" has been estab-
lished for over sixty years and that the State of Florida could not "create
a new rule of constitutional law by requiring" parental consent before a
child exercises her First Amendment right." The court therefore found
for Frazier on both the as-applied challenge and the facial challenge.45
The court held that the requirement to stand during pledging and the
parental-consent requirement were unconstitutional and thereby granted
summary judgment in favor of Frazier.46
2. THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT'S RESPONSE: DID ITS
DOG EAT ITS HOMEWORK?
After the district court's decision in favor of Frazier, the State of
Florida timely appealed to the Eleventh Circuit, which subsequently
heard the case as Frazier v. Winn.47 On appeal, the court focused solely
on the facial challenge and did not speak to the merits of the as-applied
challenge.4" In addressing the facial challenge, the court looked at two
separate issues. First, the court focused on the statute's requirements that
"civilians" stand at attention during the Pledge and asked whether this
requirement was unconstitutional.49 Second, the court addressed whether
the statute's requirement that a student obtain a written request from a
parent and submit it to the school administrator to be excused from reci-
tation was constitutional.5"
First addressing the requirement that the excused students must
stand during the Pledge regardless of parental consent, the court agreed
with both Frazier and the district court by affirming the decision that the
standing requirement shouldn't be enforced.5" The State argued that the
standing requirement only applied to the students who had not been
excused from reciting the Pledge, but the court found that the State's
interpretation was improbable due to the plain language of the statute,
requiring all civilians to stand.52 After concluding the standing require-
ment to be unenforceable, the court still refused to declare the statute as
a whole unconstitutional. Following one of the many canons of statutory
construction, the court held "that this portion of the statute [the standing
43. Id. at 1368.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 1368-69.
46. Id. at 1369.
47. 535 F.3d 1279 (11th Cir. 2008), reh'g en banc denied, 555 F.3d 1292 (11 th Cir. 2009).
48. Id. at 1282 n.2.
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requirement] may be severed, leaving the statute otherwise enforcea-
ble. ' 53 The court considered whether the legislature would have enacted
these provisions independently. Not wanting to invalidate the work of
the elected representatives of Florida, the court concluded that the legis-
lature would have enacted these provisions independently of each other,
and therefore the court severed the standing requirement of the statute,
thereby leaving the rest of the statute intact. 4
After severing the standing requirement, the court then briefly
focused on the more controversial aspect of the statute, the parental-
consent requirement. Frazier challenged the parental-consent require-
ment, arguing that the statute deters free speech too broadly and is there-
fore facially invalid as overbroad. The court stated that an overbreadth
challenge "is based on a statute's possible direct and indirect burdens on
speech. The overbreadth doctrine permits the facial invalidation of laws
that inhibit the exercise of First Amendment rights if the impermissible
applications of the law are substantial." 6 After presenting the frame-
work for overbreadth challenges, the court then quickly concluded, with-
out much analysis, that this statute was primarily a parental-rights
statute. In switching gears, the court, during its brief analysis of the
parental-consent requirement, failed to explain why Frazier's over-
breadth challenge was not substantial. In coming to its conclusion that
the statute was overly broad, the court concluded that the trumping right
present in this case was the right of the parent, reasoning the right of the
student was outweighed by a parents' right to "control their children's
upbringing."57 Therefore, the court primarily reached its conclusion
through a balancing test.
The court determined that they did not need to rely heavily on pre-
vious Pledge precedent, such as West Virginia State Board of Education
v. Barnette,58 because the court determined that those cases were easily
differentiated from Frazier's situation-the previous cases involved no
conflict between the child and the custodial parent. 59 The court held that
the parent's right trumps the rights of everyone else in this case.
"Although we accept that the government ordinarily may not compel
students to participate in the Pledge, we also recognize that a parent's
53. Id.
54. Id. at 1283.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 1283-84.
57. Id. at 1284.
58. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
59. See Winn, 535 F.3d at 1284 n.5 ("None of the decisions relied upon by Plaintiff and the
district court decide the rights of custodial parents in opposition to the rights of their children




right to interfere with the wishes of his child is stronger than a public
school official's right to interfere on behalf of the school's own
interest."'6
The court reached this conclusion by focusing on the fact that other
courts have recognized a parent's right to take a substantial role in the
decisions regarding his child's "education on civic values."'" Moreover,
the court acknowledged that the Supreme Court, in Wisconsin v.
Yoder,6 2 extended this parental right to religious upbringing. The issue
still remains, and the court failed to comment on, whether the recitation
of the Pledge actually falls within the parental right to control education,
civic values, or religious future. In the end, the court determined that the
interests of the parent outweighed any other competing interests, and,
thus, the court reversed the district court's decision and upheld the
remaining portion of the statute.
After holding that the parent's right outweighed the student's, the
court could have ended its opinion, but instead it included further state-
ments that must be examined. First, the court stated that, even if the
rights in conflict were to favor a "mature high school student," Frazier
still would not have been able to prevail because he failed to articulate
that a substantial number of constitutional violations would rise to the
level needed in order to successfully win an overbreadth challenge.6 3 In
making this statement, the court seemed to acknowledge that age is a
factor, and there will be times when a mature student could challenge
the statute as applied to him. Also, the court seemed to imply, without
expressly stating, that the number of instances where a parent and stu-
dent will disagree over the recitation of the Pledge will be extremely
small, and hence an overbreadth challenge that would declare the statute
unconstitutional is unwarranted. Lastly, the court, in a brief footnote and
without further clarification, stated that courts in other circumstances,
such as abortion and condom distribution, have recognized limited con-
stitutional rights for minors.
While this statement is true, the court failed to acknowledge abor-
tion cases that create procedures allowing a minor to bypass her parents
in order to exercise limited constitutional rights-a procedure that is not
in place here. Ultimately, the court declined to accept Frazier's facial
challenge and reversed the district court's decision concerning the
parental-consent requirement, but it did uphold its decision declaring the
standing requirement unconstitutional.
60. Id. at 1285 (citation omitted).
61. Id.
62. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
63. Winn, 535 F.3d at 1285.
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3. REHEARING EN BANC DENIED: BARKETT GRADES THE ELEVENTH
CIRCUIT'S DECISION-SO MUCH RED INK!
After the Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court's decision con-
cerning the constitutionality of the parental-consent requirement, Frazier
filed a petition for rehearing en banc. The petition was denied, but Judge
Rosemary Barkett dissented, pointing out all the flaws and concerns cre-
ated by the Eleventh Circuit's panel decision.' Her dissent began by
arguing her belief that the Eleventh Circuit's decision directly contra-
vened precedent, originating with Barnette, entrenched in our legal sys-
tem for over sixty-five years.65 She stated that the court incorrectly
failed to apply strict-scrutiny analysis to the infringement upon the stu-
dent's fundamental right to free speech.66 Through the court's failure to
provide strict-scrutiny analysis and its complete disregard of precedent,
she believes that the court upheld a "patently unconstitutional" permis-
sion requirement.67 Just as the district court noted, Judge Barkett
acknowledged that Barnette provided the student a right to choose not to
recite the Pledge.68 Furthermore, she highlighted that the Barnette Court
recognized that the "Pledge requires affirmation of a belief and an atti-
tude of mind."69
Also, there is nothing in the Barnette decision, or any other case
law, that allows student's free speech to depend on parental consent. The
Barnette Court explained that the right belonged to the student. Rather
than focusing on the student's right, the court in Frazier created an
effective parental veto of that right. Although she believes that the par-
ents do not have a right under the facts of Frazier, Judge Barkett pro-
claimed that the court must weigh any conflict of these rights, instead of
sidestepping the right of the student as articulated in Barnette.70 There-
fore one needs to balance "the students' free speech right guaranteed by
Barnette against whatever purported rights (and their sources) parents
may have to compel their children to violate their conscience. "71
Next, Judge Barkett criticized the panel's usage of the overbreadth
doctrine. She argued that the overbreadth doctrine is not the proper doc-
trine for handling this case. "The overbreadth doctrine is applied to laws
64. Frazier v. Alexandre, 555 F.3d 1292, 1292-1300 (11 th Cir. 2009) (Barkett, J., dissenting).
65. Id. at 1293.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. See id. at 1294 ("The Supreme Court recognized that this compulsion infringed on the
students' rights of conscience, and thus, found the law unconstitutional. There is no distinction
between the rights of students in West Virginia schools and the rights of students in Florida
schools.").
69. Id. (quoting W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Bamette, 319 U.S. 624, 633 (1943)).




that curtail or prohibit speech, not laws where the State compels individ-
uals to say things that might contravene their most deeply-held
beliefs. 72 She reasoned that this statute does not prohibit speech, but
instead compelled the student to speak against his conscience.73 Apply-
ing strict scrutiny, she concluded that the Pledge statute failed." In
doing so, she enunciated that "[the State's interest in disseminating an
ideology] cannot outweigh an individual's First Amendment right to
avoid becoming the courier for such message.
Failure to apply strict scrutiny was just one of the constitutional
mistakes the panel made. Judge Barkett pointed out that the panel failed
to acknowledge, never mind weigh, the constitutional rights that minors
possess. 76 It is her belief that the court allowed the State to delegate to
the parents a right to compel speech; but, the problem, she argued, is that
the states cannot delegate such a power because states do not possess a
power to compel speech. 77 Simply put, a state cannot delegate some-
thing it cannot do on its own. She wrote:
This case is not about whether parents, on their own, can require their
children to recite the Pledge of Allegiance, but whether the State can
burden a clear First Amendment right either by requiring consenting
parents to give permission before their children may exercise their
constitutional rights or by using non-consenting parents to compel the
expression of beliefs that students do not hold.78
Barkett's next argument was that the court never acknowledged the
rights of the minor. According to her, the panel's opinion merely "[gave]
lip service to the principle that minors possess constitutional rights, but
asserts that those rights are trumped by the parents' wishes."79 She, once
again, claimed that the court misapplied and misstated Supreme Court
precedent. She pointed out that in Planned Parenthood of Central Mis-
souri v. Danforth8° the Court made it clear that parents cannot infringe
on a minor's constitutional right to privacy concerning an abortion s"
According to Judge Barkett, the fundamental fight present in that case
equaled the fundamental right in this case. "A minor's right to express
an act of conscience is just as worthy of protection as a minor's constitu-
72. Id. at 1295 n.8.
73. Id. at 1295.
74. Id. at 1296.
75. Id. (alteration in original).
76. Id.
77. Id. at 1297.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
81. Alexandre, 555 F.3d at 1297 (Barkett, J., dissenting).
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tional right of privacy to obtain an abortion."82
A question remains. Is the Winn decision correct? Part III explores
and answers this question.
III. ON TO ENGLISH CLASS: To PLEDGE OR NOT To PLEDGE?
A. Florida Copies the United States' Homework: Question of
Straightforward Statutory Interpretation?
The courts easily answered one of the two questions presented-
the question of statutory interpretation. With this issue, we begin.
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals first attacked the statute's
standing requirement. In pertinent part, the Florida Statute stated, "Upon
written request by [the student's] parent, the student must be excused
from reciting the pledge. When the pledge is given, civilians must show
full respect to the flag by standing at attention."83 Frazier attacked the
standing-at-attention requirement, for he believed that the statute's lan-
guage forced students to stand even when their parents excused them
from reciting the pledge.84 In Frazier v. Alexandre, Judge Ryskamp, in
the district court, held that the statute required students to stand, regard-
less of parental waiver.85 By forcing students to stand at attention, the
statute violated students' First Amendment rights.86 The Eleventh Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals affirmed this decision by the district court in Fra-
zier v. Winn.8 7 This surprises not. In contrast, Florida's interpretation of
the standing requirement amazes. With logic and statutory-interpretation
tools, 88 the courts unraveled the bizarre arguments Florida made to the
courts.
The statute first mentions students and excuses them from reciting
the pledge. Noticeably, the next sentence forces civilians to stand. The
switch from the noun "student" to the noun "civilians" indicates a differ-
ence between "students" and "civilians." Despite this clear-cut distinc-
tion, Florida attempted to clean this cogent distinction with a good legal
sanitizer.
82. Id. at 1298.
83. FLA. STAT. § 1003.44(1) (2007).
84. See Frazier v. Winn, 535 F.3d 1279, 1281 (1 th Cir. 2008) (per curiam), reh'g en banc
denied, 555 F.3d 1292.
85. 434 F. Supp. 2d 1350, 1359-62 (S.D. Fla. 2006), aff'd in part, rev'd in part sub nom.
Winn, 535 F.3d 1279, reh'g en banc denied, 555 F.3d 1292.
86. Id.
87. Winn, 535 F.3d at 1283.
88. For discussions on statutory interpretation see, for example, William S. Blatt, Interpretive
Communities: The Missing Element in Statutory Interpretation, 95 Nw. U. L. REV. 629 (2001);
William N. Eskridge, Jr., "Fetch Some Soupmeat," 16 CARDOZO L. REV. 2209 (1995); Jonathan
T. Molot, The Rise and Fall of Textualism, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (2006).
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On appeal, Florida used three legal arguments to mask the statute's
discordant use of the word "student" in one sentence and "civilians" in
the next sentence.
First, Florida argued that courts should construe the statute to pre-
serve its constitutionality.89 Florida read the statute as describing "pledg-
ing" as (1) oral recitation of the Pledge, (2) standing to pledge, and (3)
holding one's hand over her heart. The statute, Florida argued, excused
students from "pledging." If a student had the proper excuse from
"pledging," she had an excuse from oral recitation, holding her hand
over her heart, and standing.9" Therefore, a student excused from the
Pledge had an excuse from all three required actions, including standing.
Florida's second argument consisted of two sentences in its initial
brief to the Eleventh Circuit. "[T]he Florida legislature in 1987 enacted
the portion of the statute excusing students from Pledge participation.
This legislative addition, enacted [forty-five] years after the civilian por-
tion, is a specific and recent enactment that readily distinguishes the
prior 'civilian' language."9 In other words, Florida began excusing stu-
dents from the Pledge in 1987. The "civilian" language predated this
amendment to the law. For the State, this sufficiently indicated that the
Florida Legislature meant to excuse students regardless of the "civilian"
language.
Third, Florida argued that the statute consistently distinguished
between civilians and students. "[T]he legislature meant to treat students
and civilians separately." 92 This distinction meant that students need not
stand if their parents excused them from pledging, for the "civilians"
category excluded all students. Two different Pledge-participation stan-
dards existed, one for civilians and the other for students.93
All three arguments fail. The third reason-that the statute consist-
ently distinguished civilians and students-leads to bizarre conclusions.
"Upon written request by [a student's] parent, the student must be
excused from reciting the pledge. When the pledge is given, civilians
must show full respect to the flag by standing at attention . . . ."94 If the
word "civilian" excluded students, then only students could refuse to
stand at attention. For the language in the statute is mandatory. Civilians
must stand at attention. Following this interpretation, one ends up in
Wonderland. A student, with parental permission, can refuse to stand at
89. See State Defendants/Appellants' Initial Brief at 27, Winn, 535 F.3d 1279 (No. 06-14462-
FF).
90. Id. at 28.
91. Id. at 29 (citation omitted).
92. Id.
93. State Defendants/Appellants' Reply Brief at 10, Winn, 535 F.3d 1279 (No. 06-14462-FF).
94. FLA. STAT. § 1003.44(1) (2007).
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attention. In contrast, a visiting adult, regardless of his conscientious
beliefs, must stand at attention if the Pledge begins during his visit.
Thus, despite students' required school attendance, a minor child of
seven who lacks any desire to forego standing at attention and who has
parental permission can refuse to stand at attention. Notwithstanding any
parental permission or beliefs, an adult lacks any such right. As Alice
from Alice's Adventure in Wonderland stated, "Oh dear, what nonsense
I'm talking!"95
Both courts quickly uncovered the nonsense in this argument. The
United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida
responded to Florida's argument with disbelief. "Were such the case, the
State of Florida would be commanding those individuals, but not its stu-
dents, to stand at attention for the pledge recitation. Students would pos-
sess greater rights than [adults]." 96 The court of appeals agreed with the
district court's construction.97
Florida's second argument raises other problems. Initially, Florida
relies on the Florida Legislature's intent at the time of the amendment.
Because courts will not look at a legislature's intent if the statute's lan-
guage lacks ambiguities, Florida assumes that the statute contains ambi-
guities.98 But no apparent ambiguities exist. People use the words
"civilian" and "student" in common parlance, and the words lack any
technical aspect that may raise concern. For most people, a student is a
civilian.
Nevertheless, assume arguendo that the statute contains some ambi-
guity. Then, problems still exist. Florida argued that the Florida Legisla-
ture meant to exclude students from the "civilian" category. "[B]ecause
the specific word 'student' is referenced in the first part of the chal-
lenged statute and is followed by the broader term 'civilian,' . . . 'civil-
ian' excludes 'students. ' ' 99 But, an equal, opposite argument exists.
Under the canon of ejusdem generis, if a general phrase, here "civilian,"
follows a specific thing, here "student," courts read the general phrase to
be of the same nature as the specific."0 Indeed, the clear meaning of the
word "civilian" engulfs the word "student." No reason exists to apply
one reading over the other.
95. LEWIS CARROLL, ALICE'S ADVENTURES IN WONDERLAND AND THROUGH THE LOOKING-
GLASS 17 (Penguin Books 2003) (1872).
96. Frazier v. Alexandre, 434 F. Supp. 2d 1350, 1360 (S.D. Fla. 2006), affd in part, rev'd in
part sub nom. Winn, 535 F.3d 1279, reh'g en banc denied, 555 F.3d 1292 (11 th Cir. 2009).
97. Winn, 535 F.3d at 1283.
98. See, e.g., John Paul Stevens, The Shakespeare Canon of Statutory Construction, 140 U.
PA. L. REV. 1373, 1374 (1992).
99. Alexandre, 434 F. Supp. 2d at 1359-60.
100. See, e.g., id. at 1360.
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Next, someone in Florida's position can argue that the Florida Leg-
islature sloppily amended the existing law. Because of the Florida Legis-
lature's renegade amendment, maybe courts shouldn't apply ejusdem
generis but instead look at intent.
Regarding legislative history, the legislative history harmed Flor-
ida's argument. The original version of the Florida statute photocopies
the federal version of the statute.' 0 ' And the federal version of the stat-
ute discussed two categories: "civilians" and "military personnel."'' 2
Thus, far from highlighting the Florida Legislature's desire to distin-
guish between students and nonstudent civilians, the legislative history
underscores the plain meaning of the word "civilian." Civilian indicates
anyone not a member of the military. Noting this history, Judge Rys-
kamp wrote, "The inclusion of the term 'civilian' is hardly a choice by
the Florida legislature to distinguish between 'students' and 'non-stu-
dent civilians' as suggested by the State Defendants."'0 3 Instead, the
word distinguished between military personnel and those not in the mili-
tary. The court of appeals agreed that the civilian-military distinction
created the correct interpretation of the statute.' 04
This legislative history creates a murky legislative intent. If the
Florida Legislature amended the law to excuse students from pledging
after the word "civilian" existed in the statute, the Florida Legislature
could have distinguished students from civilians. It could have done so
explicitly, clearly, and precisely. But the Florida Legislature didn't,
which raises concerns about the legislature's intent.
Finally, Florida's first argument misconstrues the canon that courts
should interpret statutes to preserve a statute's constitutionality. This
argument fails for the same reason as Florida's second argument. Again,
nothing indicates that the statute has ambiguities. If a statute lacks ambi-
guities, courts cannot interpret the statute so as to preserve it. 105 Indeed,
because the statute lacks ambiguities, only one interpretation exists, the
correct interpretation. Courts must interpret unambiguous statutes as
written.'0 6 But, even assuming some ambiguity, the legislative history
shows, at best, a Florida Legislature that could but never did distinguish
between students and civilians and, at worst, a Florida Legislature that
intended to create a distinction between civilians and military personnel.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 1361.
103. Id.
104. Frazier v. Winn, 535 F.3d 1279, 1283 (11th Cir. 2008) (per curiam), reh'g en banc
denied, 555 F.3d 1292 (1 1th Cir. 2009).
105. E.g., INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 336 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Miller v. French,
530 U.S. 327, 340-41 (2000).
106. E.g., Davis v. Mich. Dep't of the Treasury, 489 U.S. 803, 809 n.3 (1989).
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Essentially, Florida asked the courts here to rewrite the statute in
likely contravention of legislative intent. The absurdity of this request
causes astonishment. A state asked a federal court to interpret a statute,
seemingly unambiguous on its face, in a manner in disaccord with a
state legislature's intent. Florida overlooked the implications of its
request on a federalist system. By requesting the courts to rewrite the
statute, it also overlooked the underlying purpose of the canon it
invoked. Courts read statutes to avoid constitutional issues because they
hope to not infringe upon the legislature's role.' °7 Here, where the legis-
lative intent highlighted the civilian-military distinction, having a court
replace the civilian-military distinction with a civilian-student distinc-
tion would let courts legislate. Luckily, the district court and court of
appeals overlooked neither federalism nor the canon's underlying
purpose.
B. More Involvement than Your Average PTA: Reconciling
Parents' and Children's Rights
Part III.B.1 focuses on the use and abuse of Pledge jurisprudence,
with emphasis on the Eleventh Circuit's decision to distinguish the
Supreme Court case of West Virginia State Board of Education v. Bar-
nette."°8 Additionally, Part III.B.2 explores precedent that firmly estab-
lishes that minors possess constitutional rights, especially the right to
freedom of speech. Part III.B.3 examines the parental right to control the
upbringing of one's child, and an analysis as to whether that right is
implicated in the situation presented in Winn. Lastly, Part III.B.4 com-
pares parental-notification requirements in cases where minors seek
abortions to the parental-consent requirement in the pledging statute at
issue here.
1. IS THE COURT BOUND BY BARNETTE?
In Barnette, a group of Jehovah's Witnesses brought suit in the
district court for injunctive relief to prevent the enforcement of resolu-
tions adopted by the board of education, which required the daily recita-
tion of the Pledge of Allegiance. 9 The board of education's regulations
provided that the refusal to salute was an act of insubordination, was
punishable with expulsion, and was proper cause to deny readmission
107. See generally Gilbert Lee, Comment, How Many Avoidance Cannons Are There After
Clark v. Martinez?, 10 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 193 (2007) (discussing the tension between the courts'
constitutional-avoidance canon, which makes all efforts to avoid striking down legislative laws,
and courts' attempts to follow a legislature's intent in passing a law).
108. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
109. Id. at 629.
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until the child complied with the daily-recitation requirement.' Pursu-
ant to the resolution, the children of the Jehovah faith had been expelled
from school, and their parents had been prosecuted. ' I ' Declaring the res-
olution's requirements unconstitutional, the Court proclaimed that "the
compulsory flag salute and pledge requires affirmation of a belief and an
attitude of mind" and that any "censorship or suppression of expression
of opinion is tolerated by our Constitution only when the expression
presents a clear and present danger of action of a kind the State is
empowered to prevent and punish."'" 2 Reasoning that uniformity and
nationalism could not justify such state action, the Court firmly held that
state action compelling recitation "invades the sphere of intellect and
spirit which it is the purpose of the First Amendment to our Constitution
to reserve from all official control."' '
13
Although the Supreme Court's hallmark 1943 decision in Barnette
appeared to enunciate a clear rule that it was unconstitutional to compel
recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance, the Eleventh Circuit's decision in
Winn not only backpedals from Barnette's clear mandate, but also vio-
lates American jurisprudence with regard to the Court's treatment of the
rights of minors. Winn takes a clear divergence from unwavering and
longstanding precedent, as no case has ever conditioned a minor's free-
dom against compelled recitation of the Pledge to depend on whether the
child's parent agreed with them." 14
The Eleventh Circuit in Winn justified much of its holding on its
belief that the outcome was not controlled by Barnette. "5 Winn placed
emphasis on the Barnette opinion's statement that "[t]he freedom
asserted by [the Plaintiffs] does not bring them into collision with rights
asserted by any other individual."" 6 Attempting to skirt Barnette's hold-
ing, the Winn court reasoned that Barnette was distinguishable because
the student's refusal to participate in the Pledge did interfere with the
rights of another individual-"their parents' fundamental right to con-
trol their children's upbringing."'" 7 Essentially, in Barnette the parents
and child were in agreement that the child should not be required to say
the pledge," 8 and as a result the Winn court reasoned that the parent's
right to control the upbringing of her child wasn't interfered with.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 630.
112. Id. at 633 (emphasis added).
113. Id. at 642.
114. Frazier v. Alexandre, 555 F.3d 1292, 1294-95 (11 th Cir. 2009) (Barkett, J., dissenting).
115. Frazier v. Winn, 535 F.3d 1279, 1284 (1lth Cir. 2008) (per curiam), reh'g en banc
denied, 555 F.3d 1292.
116. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 630.
117. Winn, 535 F.3d at 1284 (emphasis added).
118. See Barnette, 319 U.S. at 629.
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Although the court's choice to distinguish Barnette on this point
implies that parent and child in Winn did not agree on the issue, Judge
Barkett's dissent from the denial of rehearing en banc correctly points
out that in fact there was no conflict between parent and child in this
case." 9 In fact, Cameron Frazier and his mother, Christine, agreed that
Cameron should not have to say the Pledge if he does not want to.'
20
Hence, an attempt to distinguish Supreme Court precedent on such
grounds is erroneous.
Furthermore, it would be a futile exercise for a parent to cite her
right to control her child's upbringing as being violated by her child's
exercise of his freedom of speech in choosing not to pledge. That paren-
tal right had been established more than twenty years prior to Barnette in
Myers v. Nebraska,1 2 and that opinion clearly stated that the child's
decision to not say the Pledge did not infringe on anyone else's rights-
which must include the parental right to control the child's upbringing.
Thus, where there existed no conflict between parent and child in either
Barnette or Winn, the Winn court's attempt to distinguish Barnette on
this point must be flawed.
122
By distinguishing Barnette, the Winn court effectively ignores Bar-
nette's vesting of the right against compelled recitation completely in the
student. Again, Barnette did not hold that students have the right against
compelled recitation of the Pledge only when their parents agree. The
Winn opinion completely ignores the fact that "[t]he Florida statute at
issue would compel the very same students in Barnette to first obtain
permission to do that which the Supreme Court has already explicitly
ruled they have a constitutional right to do."'23 The Winn court appears
to strategically read the case out of Barnette's purview, and hence the
court doesn't give any weight to the fact that minors possess such rights,
by themselves.
If Barnette had been applied in Winn, the court would have been
required to apply strict scrutiny, because the student's fundamental right
to free speech is infringed. Thus, the court would need to determine
whether the restriction was necessary "to prevent grave and immediate
119. Alexandre, 555 F.3d at 1295 (Barkett, J., dissenting).
120. See id.
121. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
122. The fact that Cameron and his mother, Christine, agreed on Cameron's decision against
recitation didn't matter, for the court saw that the overbreadth challenge to the statute was only
implicated when the parent and child disagree over whether the child should pledge. Ergo, the
court must have classified Barnette as a case where parent and child were in agreement, and
Winn's overbreadth challenge as one where a parent and his child disagreed. See discussion infra
Part 1I.C.
123. Alexandre, 555 F.3d at 1294-95 (Barkett, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
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danger to interests which the State may lawfully protect."1 24 The statute
would have failed strict scrutiny, as a state's interest in requiring stu-
dents to pledge was already deemed an insufficient state interest to so
burden the fundamental right of freedom of speech in Barnette. 125 How-
ever, the "lawful state interest" urged by the Winn court is the state's
interest in protecting the parents' fundamental right to control the
upbringing of their children. 26 Despite the questionable merits of this
state interest, which will be discussed at length below, the court fails to
abide by Barnette and apply strict scrutiny.
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals recently issued an opinion
on a similar issue. In Holloman v. Harland, high-school student Michael
Holloman brought a § 1983 action against his teacher, principal, and
school board based on his claim that they violated his free-speech rights
when they punished him for silently raising his fist during the Pledge of
Allegiance.' 27 Holloman claimed that he did so as a form of protest of
the administration's actions, where the administration had punished one
of his classmates for abstaining from the Pledge. 128 The Eleventh Circuit
accurately stated that "[t]he Speech Clause of the First Amendment pro-
tects at least two separate, yet related, rights: (1) the right to freedom of
expression, and (2) the right to be free from compelled expression.
These rights unquestionably exist in public schools."'' 29 The court found
that Holloman's First Amendment rights had been violated, because
when he resisted the compelled recitation requirement he was chastised
and ultimately received a paddling as punishment for the exercise of
constitutional rights.
1 30
The Eleventh Circuit's panel decision in Winn is especially puz-
zling in light of Holloman, a case with markedly similar facts and a case
where the court appeared a defender of student First Amendment rights.
Applying Holloman to the case at hand would indicate that Frazier's
rights were also violated, as he was cursed at, belittled, and called names
by his teacher when he refused to say the Pledge. However, the fact that
Holloman was an as-applied challenge, and Winn was only heard by the
Eleventh Circuit facially, can explain this discrepancy.
124. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 639 (1943).
125. See id. at 642.
126. Frazier v. Winn, 535 F.3d 1279, 1284 (1 1th Cir. 2008) (per curiam), reh'g en banc
denied, 555 F.3d 1292.
127. 370 F.3d 1252, 1259 (11 th Cir. 2004).
128. Id. at 1261.
129. Id. at 1264 (citation omitted).
130. Id. at 1268-69. Note that, rather than serving the detentions that he was given as
punishment, due to the end of the school year rapidly approaching, Holloman was paddled by the
principal for his refusal to recite the Pledge properly. Id. at 1261.
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2. DO MINORS HAVE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS?
Although the Winn court avoids Barnette's mandate by incorrectly
distinguishing it, the court here utterly makes no mention, and gives no
deference, to the constitutional rights possessed by the students. In re
Gault famously proclaimed in 1967 that "neither the Fourteenth Amend-
ment nor the Bill of Rights is for adults alone."'' Similarly, in Tinker v.
Des Moines Independent Community School District, the Court struck
down a school's policy that required removal of armbands utilized by
students as a means of peaceful protest against the Vietnam War.
132
There, the Court reasoned that the wearing of an armband as a means of
protest was encompassed by the Free Speech Clause, and that because
"[s]tudents in school as well as out of school are 'persons' under our
Constitution . . . [t]hey are possessed of fundamental rights which the
State must respect."' 33 The Supreme Court has also said that constitu-
tional freedoms must be attentively protected within American class-
rooms. 134  Despite the numerous recitations and reaffirmations
throughout Supreme Court jurisprudence that minors possess constitu-
tional rights, "[n]oticeably absent . . . is any reference to a requirement
that a parent or guardian approve of a student's decision to exercise First
Amendment rights."'13' Rather, "Tinker cedes the exercise of conscience,
and constitutional rights, to the individual student, not the parent."'
136
Moreover, freedom of speech is so revered and necessary to a free
people that it is given a status almost superior to other fundamental
rights. In fact, Justice Benjamin Cardozo boldly declared in Palko v.
Connecticut that the freedom of speech "is the matrix, the indispensable
condition, of nearly every other form of freedom."1 37 As the foundation
for all the other rights Americans hold dear, freedom of speech deserves
only the most critical review. The almost superior status of freedom of
speech should not be encumbered when students use speech in a way
that doesn't harm others or encourage other social ills.
Despite the clear voice of precedent, the only consideration of the
rights possessed by minors is the court's conclusory statement that "the
State's interest in recognizing and protecting the rights of parents on
some educational issues is sufficient to justify the restriction of some
131. 387 U.S. 1, 13 (1967).
132. 393 U.S. 503, 514 (1969).
133. Id. at 511.
134. See id. at 512.
135. Answer Brief of Appellee at 21, Frazier v. Winn, 535 F.3d 1279 (11 th Cir. 2008) (No. 06-
14462-FF), reh'g en banc denied, 555 F.3d 1292 (11 th Cir. 2009).
136. Id. at 22.
137. 302 U.S. 319, 327 (1937).
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students' freedom of speech." '38 The fundamental right to freedom of
speech deserves more than this summary dismissal. Even without apply-
ing Barnette, the court should have applied strict scrutiny, as the funda-
mental rights of minors are infringed on by the statute.
3. DOES THE PARENTAL RIGHT TO CONTROL UPBRINGING
EXTEND TO COMPEL SPEECH?
The panel decision's contention that the student's abstention from
the Pledge infringes on the parent's right to control her child's upbring-
ing severely mischaracterizes precedent on this issue. That right does not
stretch as far as the court extends it.
In 1923, the Court in Meyer v. Nebraska first encountered the
issues of whether a parent possessed a right to control the upbringing of
his child and whether the parent's right was impermissibly infringed
upon by a statute that prohibited the teaching of foreign languages in the
elementary-classroom setting.' 39 There, the Court reasoned that such a
statute interfered with parent's power to control his children's educa-
tion.'4 ° This right was addressed again a few years later, in Pierce v.
Society of Sisters.'4' The Court faced the issue of whether a statutory
requirement that all children attend public elementary school was consti-
tutional. 42 There, the Court also held that the liberty of the parents to
control the upbringing of their children was unconstitutionally compro-
mised by the statute, as the statute would not permit parents to send their
children to parochial schools.' 4 3 The Court in Pierce extended Meyer's
holding to encompass a parent's right to control the upbringing of his
children not only with regard to education, but with regard to religion as
well.
In Wisconsin v. Yoder, several Amish students and their parents
challenged an Oregon statute that mandated school attendance until the
age of sixteen.'" The challengers contended that such a requirement
interfered with their religious beliefs insofar as the ideals taught in high
school are in opposition to Amish values.' 45 The Court held that the
challengers' interests in the free exercise of their religious beliefs out-
weighed the state's interest in compulsory education beyond the eighth
138. Winn, 535 F.3d at 1285.
139. 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923).
140. Id. at 401-03.
141. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
142. Id. at 530.
143. Id. at 534-35.
144. 406 U.S. 205, 207 (1972).
145. Id. at 215.
2009]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
grade. 146
The Winn court used these cases to establish that a parent has a
fundamental right to control the educational upbringing of his children,
and that such a parental interest was sufficient to limit the students' free-
dom of speech.'47
a. Positive Versus Negative Right
Judge Barkett's dissent from denial of rehearing en banc argued
that the panel decision mischaracterized the nature of this parental right
of control. This right has been interpreted throughout precedent as grant-
ing a "custodial parent [the] constitutional right to determine, without
undue interference by the State, how best to raise, nurture, and educate
the child."' 48 Judge Barkett contended that cases invoking this parental
right have done so only in the context of protecting the parent and child
from the state's infringement. As a result, she asserted that this right
cannot be positively invoked to permit a parent and state to work in
cahoots to marginalize the child's fundamental right to free speech.
149
Thus, since the parental right to control upbringing is inapplicable to this
situation, the court's holding that the parental right trumps the child's
free-speech right would be fatally flawed. Although Judge Barkett's
summarization of precedent with regard to the parental right to control
upbringing is generally correct, the Supreme Court's decision in Parham
v. J.R. 5o throws her assertion for a loop.
In Parham, the Court upheld a Georgia statute that gave parents the
ability to voluntarily commit their children to state mental institutions. 1 '
In upholding the statute, the Court reasoned that, although minors have a
"substantial liberty interest in not being confined" against their will,' 52
the right of the parent to control the health and welfare of her children
ensured that the parent maintained the dominant role in the commitment
decision.' 53 Parham appears to be a case that allows the parental right to
control upbringing to be invoked by the parent when a parent and his
child disagree over a fundamental right of the child-here the child's
right against confinement. This upsets Judge Barkett's classification of
146. See id.
147. Frazier v. Winn, 535 F.3d 1279, 1285 (11th Cir. 2008) (per curiam), reh'g en banc
denied, 555 F.3d 1292 (1 1th Cir. 2009).
148. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 95 (2000) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
149. Alexandre, 555 F.3d at 1298 (Barkett, J., dissenting).
150. 442 U.S. 584 (1979).
151. Id. at 620-21.
152. Id. at 600.
153. Id. at 604.
[Vol. 63:905
MAMA KNOWS BEST
the parental right as a negative one. Moreover, the Parham Court enun-
ciates some disturbing dicta:
We cannot assume that the result in Meyer v. Nebraska and Pierce v.
Society of Sisters would have been different if the children there had
announced a preference to learn only English or a preference to go to
a public, rather than a church, school. The fact that a child may balk
at hospitalization or complain about a parental refusal to provide cos-
metic surgery does not diminish the parents' authority to decide what
is best for the child. 154
Nonetheless, Parham does not automatically upset the remaining
analysis, as the Court emphasized the fact that the commitment statute
did not give parents "an absolute right to commit their children to state
mental hospitals," because the hospitals must make their own, indepen-
dent assessment of the child's mental health. 155 Therefore, while Judge
Barkett's positive-and-negative-right analysis is questioned after review-
ing Parham, Parham weighs the two competing rights-something that
the Winn court still got wrong.
b. Limited Scope of Parental Upbringing Right
Additionally, even if the parental-upbringing right allowed for a
positive invocation, the scope of the right has only been extended to
allow a parent to control certain aspects of the child's upbringing. As
mentioned above, parents have been granted the ability to direct their
children's education and religious upbringing.'56 But parents have never
been granted the right to control all aspects of their child's life, nor to
direct or veto their child's usage of their freedom of speech.
Though many would likely argue that pledging allegiance is part of
a child's school education, this argument is flawed as a child doesn't
"learn" United States history or civics from reciting those words. The
Southern District Court of Florida reiterated this point by stating that
pledging doesn't merely acquaint students with what the Pledge is, or
what it means-compulsory recitation requires "students to declare a
belief." '57 Few could contend with teaching students about history, patri-
otism, and the flag; but mandating students to make a positive affirma-
tion against their will can hardly be lumped under the heading of
154. Id. at 603-04 (citations omitted).
155. Id. at 604. For an excellent discussion of Parham and its application to disputes between
parents and children, see Janet L. Dolgin, The Fate of Childhood: Legal Models of Children and
the Parent-Child Relationship, 61 ALB. L. REv. 345, 388-401 (1997).
156. Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S.
390, 400 (1923).
157. Frazier v. Alexandre, 434 F. Supp. 2d 1350, 1364 (S.D. Fla. 2006), affid in part, rev'd in
part sub nom. Frazier v. Winn, 535 F.3d 1279 (1 1th Cir. 2008), reh'g en banc denied, 555 F.3d
1292 (11 th Cir. 2009).
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"education." If a student has decided that she does not wish to say the
Pledge, what would she learn from being required to do so? The only
possible lesson would be that our First Amendment has been reduced to
a mockery.
Lastly, scholars have debated the scope of the parental right to con-
trol upbringing and whether it constitutes a fundamental right. There
clearly exists confusion as to what level of scrutiny the parental right to
upbringing deserves, because, although the Winn court states that the
parent's right is fundamental,158 other courts have generally refused to
apply strict scrutiny to legislation that affects this right. 59 It is clear that
the parental right to control upbringing has limits on it, and its exact
boundaries have not been fleshed out.160 Moreover, Justice Kennedy's
dissent in Troxel v. Granville warns against an expansive and careless
view of the parental right to control the upbringing of one's own chil-
dren by stating that "courts must use considerable restraint ... as they
seek to give further and more precise definition to the right."1 6 As a
result, where the scope of the right is unclear, and its fundamental nature
has been questioned by circuit courts of appeal, surely such a right
should not outweigh the "matrix, the indispensable condition, of nearly
every other form of freedom" 162 : the right to free speech.
4. HOW DO MINORS' RIGHTS STACK UP IN OTHER CONTEXTS?
Both the panel opinion and Judge Barkett's dissent from denial of
rehearing en banc cite abortion jurisprudence to highlight how courts
158. See Winn, 535 F.3d at 1284-85. Although the Winn court relies on Yoder for the
proposition that the parental right to guide their child's educational and religious future is a
fundamental right, Yoder's application is more limited in scope. In fact, the Court stated that the
Amish's "convincing showing" was "one that probably few other religious groups or sects could
make." Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 235-36 (1972). For a thorough and thoughtful
discussion of the more limited rule announced in Yoder, see Dolgin, supra note 155, at 385-87.
159. William G. Ross, The Contemporary Significance of Meyer and Pierce for Parental
Rights Issues Involving Education, 34 AKRON L. REV. 177, 186 (2000).
160. Id. at 184. For example, the Court in Pierce stated that, despite a parental preference to
the contrary, no one seriously questioned the power of the state to require some school attendance,
that certain subjects be taught, "and that nothing be taught which is manifestly inimical to the
public welfare." Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534. Also, some more examples of encumbrances that federal
courts have placed on the parental right to control upbringing are
that parents of public school children had no constitutional basis for objecting to the
administration of psychological counseling to a third grader; the imposition of
corporal punishment on a sixth grader; a mandatory sex education program; a
compulsory community service program; mandatory academic achievement testing;
and a period for silent meditation or prayer not exceeding one minute.
Ross, supra note 159, at 188.
161. 530 U.S. 57, 95-96 (2000) (Kennedy, J. dissenting). For a wonderful discussion of the
debate associated with the scope of the parental fight to control upbringing see Ross, supra note
159.
162. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 327 (1937).
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have handled situations where parents' and minors' rights conflict. 1 63
"Although the Court has held that parents may not exercise 'an absolute,
and possibly arbitrary, veto' over [the decision to have an abortion]," the
State may impose a requirement that the minor must notify the parent of
her decision.164 Where the Supreme Court has held that a parent cannot
impose an "absolute veto" on the minor's decision to have an abortion,
why may the state impose such a veto on the minor's ability to exercise
his right to free speech? This discrepancy is more apparent given prece-
dent that establishes the somewhat "supreme" nature of the freedom of
speech and the more limited nature of the privacy right to have an abor-
tion. Though not intended to downplay the intensely important, per-
sonal, and emotional decision to have an abortion, when abortion
precedent is applied here, one cannot understand why minors are given
more discretion in their decision to have an abortion.
Additionally, Florida law requires parental notification of a minor's
decision to have an abortion,165 whereas it requires parental consent if a
minor wishes to refrain from pledging. 166 Obviously, a consent require-
ment infringes more on the minor's right. Although parental-notification
requirements involve a burden of minor's rights, notification does not
effectively assign a portion of those rights to the parents, whereas a con-
sent requirement does.
167
But, even in abortion cases, the Supreme Court has upheld parental-
involvement statutes, those that require either parental consent or notifi-
cation of a minor's intent to have an abortion, only where the statutes
create some sort of judicial-bypass mechanism.1 68 Specifically, the
Court has approved bypass procedures provided that they enable a
young woman to petition a court to determine whether she is mature
163. Frazier v. Alexandre, 555 F.3d 1292, 1297 (11th Cir. 2009) (Barkett, J., dissenting);
Winn, 535 F.3d at 1285 n.7.
164. Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 445 (1990) (quoting Planned Parenthood of Cent.
Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976)). For good discussions of abortion jurisprudence, see
Randy Beck, Gonzales, Casey, and the Viability Rule, 103 Nw. U. L. REV. 249 (2009); Peter M.
Ladwein, Note, Discerning the Meaning of Gonzales v. Carhart: The End of the Physician Veto
and the Resulting Change in Abortion Jurisprudence, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1847 (2008);
Laura J. Tepich, Note, Gonzales v. Carhart: The Partial Termination of the Right To Choose, 63
U. MIAMI L. REV. 339 (2008).
165. FLA. STAT. § 390.01114 (2008).
166. FLA. STAT. § 1003.44(1) (2007).
167. See State v. Planned Parenthood, 171 P.3d 577, 583-84 (Alaska 2007).
168. E.g., Lambert v. Wicklund, 520 U.S. 292, 295 (1997) (per curiam) ("[A] constitutional
parental consent statute must contain a bypass provision that meets four criteria: (i) allow the
minor to bypass the consent requirement if she establishes that she is mature enough and well
enough informed to make the abortion decision independently; (ii) allow the minor to bypass the
consent requirement if she establishes that the abortion would be in her best interests; (iii) ensure
the minor's anonymity; and (iv) provide for expeditious bypass procedures." (citing Bellotti v.
Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 647 (1979) (plurality opinion))).
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enough to make the decision about whether to have an abortion. 6 9 Yet,
there is no such judicial-bypass mechanism embodied in the Florida
Pledge statute. 70 Judicial-bypass mechanisms protect the minor's con-
stitutional rights, and, while parental notification may be bypassed with
regard to abortions, no similar mechanism exists for freedom of speech;
the constitutional rights of minors are given less protection when it is
their free-speech right than when it's their abortion, privacy right. 7 '
As a policy, it also does not make sense for the Florida Legislature
to enunciate a rule that says, "You don't need your parent's permission
to have an abortion, but you do need her permission if you don't want to
recite the Pledge." This discrepancy is illogical because the right to free-
dom of speech is considered the most fundamental rights guaranteed to
Americans and thus should logically be encumbered less than other
rights.
C. The Age of Enlightenment: Coherency Under the
Overbreadth Doctrine
Under neither the pledge-cases nor parental-right-to-raise-a-child
rubric does Winn make sense. The Winn opinion cannot lack all coher-
ence, as this Note so far suggests. Can it? No, it can't. How then do we
explain the per curiam opinion? The answer exists within the First
Amendment's overbreadth doctrine. For the most part, this Note has
shown the inadequacy of the Winn decision. Nevertheless, the Winn
opinion has merit, and this subsection of the Note explores this merit.
The proper view of Winn defies the notion that the Eleventh Circuit
Court of Appeals proclaimed that a parent's right to raise her child
trumps the child's First Amendment rights. Nor does Winn attempt a
coup against Barnette. Instead, the court in Winn acknowledged the stu-
dent's inability to overcome the overbreadth doctrine's threshold to
facially invalidate a law. This view demolishes the radical and bizarre
dicta in Winn and preserves students' rights throughout Florida, Ala-
bama, and Georgia.
1. THE OVERBREADTH DOCTRINE AND THE SUPREME COURT
The overbreadth doctrine allows a party to challenge as facially
unconstitutional a law that regulates speech if that law threatens pro-
169. Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 643-44; see also Katheryn D. Katz, The Pregnant Child's Right to
Self-Determination, 62 ALB. L. REV. 1119 (1999) (examining the constitutional boundaries of a
minor's right to an abortion).
170. See FLA. STAT. § 1003.44(1).
171. See Circle Sch. v. Phillips, 270 F. Supp. 2d 616, 625 (E.D. Pa. 2003), aff'd sub nom.
Circle Sch. v. Pappert, 381 F.3d 172 (3d Cir. 2004).
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tected speech. 72 Normally, the litigant bringing the overbreadth chal-
lenge argues that the law applies to other, extraneous parties in an
unconstitutional manner.'73
Imagine Brandon. Brandon gets into a shouting match with a stran-
ger in the street. Eventually, Brandon flings some hurtful, ruthless words
at the stranger. The police arrest Brandon under a local ordinance. The
ordinance restricts "all speech that might disturb" an ordinary individual
on the street. Now, Brandon clearly committed an offense. Brandon's
speech, filled with obscenity, lacks constitutional protection. Yet, this
ordinance also prohibits constitutionally protected speech. For example,
an orderly protest might disturb an ordinary individual. The overbreadth
doctrine lets Brandon challenge this statute as overbroad, for the statute
possibly infringes on protected speech as well as unprotected speech.
And the person charged for committing unprotected speech can attack
the statute in the name of protected speech.
A long list of Supreme Court cases governs the overbreadth doc-
trine. Justice Scalia, in Virginia v. Hicks,'7 4 described the strength of the
doctrine. The Supreme Court has "insisted that a law's application to
protected speech be 'substantial,' not only in an absolute sense, but also
relative to the scope of the law's plainly legitimate applications."'' 17 In
Broadrick v. Oklahoma, the Court indicated that the "substantial"
requirement played a role where the statute governed "conduct and not
merely speech."' 76 Originally, the Court asked whether a statute's ille-
gitimate applications substantially outweigh its legitimate applications
only when a statute governed conduct. A more-lenient overbreadth rule
applied to laws controlling "mere speech." But, this distinction between
conduct and speech has evaporated, and the "substantial" requirement
now plays a role regardless of whether the statute governs conduct or
speech. 177
Broadrick concerned a statute preventing civil servants from solic-
iting funds for political candidates or sitting on a committee of a politi-
cal party. 78 The Court noted, "[A] person to whom a statute may
constitutionally be applied will not be heard to challenge that statute on
the ground that it may conceivably be applied unconstitutionally to
172. ERWIN CHEMERtNSKY, CONSTITTONAL LAW 1084 (2d ed. 2005).
173. See Marc. E. Isserles, Overcoming Overbreadth: Facial Challenges and the Valid Rule
Requirement, 48 AM. U. L. REV. 359, 366 (1998).
174. 539 U.S. 113 (2003).
175. Id. at 119-20.
176. 413 U.S. 601, 615 (1973).
177. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 172, at 1088 ("[T]he Court made it clear that the
requirement for substantial overbreadth applies in all cases, whether the law regulates conduct that
communicates or pure speech." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
178. 413 U.S. at 605-06.
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others."179 But, for the First Amendment, the Court takes special
requests. In First Amendment cases, "the Court has altered its traditional
rules of standing to permit. . . 'attacks on overly broad statutes with no
requirement that the person making the attack demonstrate that his own
conduct could not be regulated by a statute drawn with the requisite
narrow specificity.' , 0 Therefore, the Supreme Court allowed the over-
breadth challenge.
Nonetheless, bringing an overbreadth challenge never guarantees
victory. The statute in Broadrick survived because the statute applied
only to partisan political activity-an activity the states can legitimately
regulate. The statute regulated a large set of impermissible conduct,
while it rarely infringed on constitutionally protected speech.' 8 1 Simi-
larly, in Virginia v. Hicks, the Court refused to invalidate a governmen-
tal agency's trespass policy. 82 The policy allowed the police to warn a
trespasser to leave a low-income housing development and, eventually,
to arrest the trespasser.183 How did the Court decide whether the policy's
application to protected speech substantially outweighed the policy's
legitimate sweep? Apparently, the Court counted.
In applying the overbreadth test, the Court listed all the unprotected
activity that the policy prevented. "The rules apply to strollers, loiterers,
drug dealers, roller skaters, bird watchers, soccer players, and others not
engaged in constitutionally protected conduct-a group that would
seemingly far outnumber First Amendment speakers."' 84 The Court's
analysis hints at a pure aggregate balance. One counts a law's valid uses
against the law's invalid uses. If the invalid uses substantially outnum-
ber the valid uses, the Court strikes the law.
Two cases illustrate when the invalid uses of a statute substantially
outnumber the valid uses.
City of Houston v. Hill questioned the constitutionality of an ordi-
nance making it unlawful to interrupt a police officer while the police
officer performed her duties.'85 Delivering the Court's opinion, Justice
Brennan noted that the statute encapsulated all speech, so long as the
speech interrupted the officer and that the police had full discretion to
select what speech interrupted them. 186 Because the statute encapsulated
all speech, the Court struck down the law, finding it "substantially
179. Id. at 610.
180. Id. at 612 (quoting Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 486 (1965)).
181. Id. at 616-17.
182. 539 U.S. 113, 115, 124 (2003).
183. Id. at 115-16.
184. Id. at 123.
185. 482 U.S. 451, 453 (1987).




Similarly, in Board of Airport Commissioners v. Jews for Jesus,
Inc., the Supreme Court upheld an overbreadth challenge against an air-
port resolution that outlawed all First Amendment speech in the air-
port.' The resolution so substantially limited valid free speech that the
Supreme Court didn't mention its legitimate sweep. 189 "[T]he resolution
at issue ... reaches the universe of expressive activity, and, by prohibit-
ing all protected expression, purports to create a virtual 'First Amend-
ment Free Zone' . . . .,"I Because the resolution affected every
individual to enter the airport, the overbreadth doctrine killed the
resolution.
Notice that, in the example above, the Constitution didn't protect
Brandon's speech. Members of the City Council v. Taxpayers for Vin-
cent'9' explains this fact's import and highlights a distinction between
as-applied and facial challenges. A city ordinance barred the posting of
signs on public property. 192 Despite the existence of an overbreadth
challenge, Taxpayers for Vincent never relied on the Broadrick standard,
as the Court refused to consider the overbreadth challenge. 193 The par-
ties suing the city had constitutionally protected speech barred by the
ordinance. Therefore, the case did not merit an overbreadth challenge.
Instead, the parties attacked the statute as applied to them.1 94 This out-
come matters. For, like in Taxpayers for Vincent, the student in Frazier
also had an as-applied challenge. Indeed, the student won his as-applied
challenge.' 95 As discussed below, although the Eleventh Circuit barely
mentioned the student's as-applied challenge, the student's as-applied-
challenge victory likely alleviated some of the Eleventh Circuit Court's
concerns.
2. WHY USE OVERBREADTH IN FIRST AMENDMENT CASES?
An understanding of why the overbreadth doctrine exists is impor-
tant in deciphering Winn. The First Amendment has always received
special consideration and attention in our system.' 96 The fear of "chil-
187. Id. at 467.
188. 482 U.S. 569, 570-72 (1987).
189. See id. at 574-75.
190. Id. at 574.
191. 466 U.S. 789 (1984).
192. Id. at 791.
193. Id. at 803.
194. Id.
195. See Frazier v. Alexandre, 434 F. Supp. 2d 1350, 1368 (S.D. Fla. 2006), affid in part, rev'd
in part sub nor. Frazier v. Winn, 535 F.3d 1279 (11 th Cir. 2008), reh'g en banc denied, 555 F.3d
1292 (11 th Cir. 2009).
196. See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 514 (1969)
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ling effects" sits near the apex of these considerations.197 The over-
breadth doctrine reflects the consideration of chilling effects. 98 When
commentators use the term "chilling effects," they mean the possibility
that a law will stifle protected speech because speakers will fear punish-
ment under the law. 199 "First Amendment overbreadth is largely a pro-
phylactic doctrine, aimed at preventing a 'chilling effect.' 200
In theory, the overbreadth doctrine remedies the following. Take,
for example, Kelly, a law-abiding citizen. Kelly worries that a statute
might punish her protected speech. In response, she stops her protected
speech. By giving a person punished for breaking the statute the ability
to attack the statute, courts mitigate the chilling effects on Kelly. While
Kelly stops her protected speech, a violator of the statute can attack and
overrule the statute. Any chilling effect lasts only ephemerally, and the
overbreadth challenge promises that a flagrant chilling effect will even-
tually end. Once a court's overbreadth mace batters the overbroad stat-
ute, Kelly resumes her protected speech.
3. PLACING WINN IN THE OVERBREADTH CONTEXT
Although the Winn opinion lacks clarity, under the overbreadth
doctrine, the Winn decision becomes coherent. For instance, the entire
debate between parents' fundamental right to raise their children and a
child's freedom of speech vaporizes. Instead of implying that a parent's
right to raise his children trumps an individual child's freedom of
speech, the panel merely highlights the legitimate sweep of the statute.
Nor does the court withhold strict scrutiny because children lack a right
(upholding students' right to wear black armbands as protest); David H. Gans, Strategic Facial
Challenges, 85 B.U. L. REV. 1333, 1342-47 (2005) (discussing why courts so readily apply
overbreadth doctrine in First Amendment cases); Paul Horwitz, Grutter's First Amendment, 46
B.C. L. REV. 461, 549-63 (2005) (exploring affirmative-action case through a First Amendment
prism); Daniel J. Solove, The First Amendment as Criminal Procedure, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 112,
151-65 (2007) (outlining how the First Amendment should influence gathering of information by
government); Bruce J. Winick, The Right To Refuse Mental Health Treatment: A First Amendment
Perspective, 44 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1, 33-41 (1989) (arguing First Amendment protects individuals
from forced psychological treatment); Aileen M. Ugalde, Comment, The Right To Arm Bears:
Activists' Protests Against Hunting, 45 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1109, 1117-32 (1991) (arguing hunter-
harassment statutes violate protestors' First Amendment rights).
197. See, e.g., Anthony Ciolli, Chilling Effects: The Communications Decency Act and the
Online Marketplace of Ideas, 63 U. MIAMI L. REv. 137, 156-65 (2008) (discussing defamation
law's chilling effects, especially on the Internet); Laura Barandes, Note, A Helping Hand:
Addressing New Implications of the Espionage Act on Freedom of the Press, 29 CARDOZO L. REv.
371, 401-02 (2007) (discussing Espionage Act's possible chilling effects).
198. See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Making Sense of Overbreadth, 100 YALE L.J. 853, 855
(1991).
199. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 300-01 (1964) (Goldberg, J., concurring in
the result); Ciolli, supra note 197, at 148.
200. Fallon, supra note 198, at 855.
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to withhold from pledging. Simply stated, the panel ignored strict scru-
tiny because the minor here brought an overbreadth challenge. In fact,
the panel refused to study the as-applied challenge, 20 1 and the panel
never decided whether strict scrutiny applied to that challenge. But, for
the overbreadth challenge, the Broadrick standard applies; strict scrutiny
does not.
A quick reading of Winn implies that a parent's fundamental right
to raise his child trumps the child's First Amendment speech. Part II.B
of this Note underscores the nonsensical nature of this argument. In her
dissent from the Eleventh Circuit's denial of rehearing en banc, Judge
Rosemary Barkett criticized the panel's decision on this point. But, the
panel's analysis functions if viewed as an overbreadth challenge.
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals panel's decision in Frazier
v. Winn 20 2 is cryptic. This per curiam decision makes broad claims. For
example, the opinion states, "[A] parent's right to interfere with the
wishes of his child is stronger than a public school official's right to
interfere on behalf of the school's own interest."203 And the opinion con-
cludes, "[T]he State's interest in recognizing and protecting the rights of
parents on some educational issues is sufficient to justify the restriction
of some student's freedom of speech.1214 So, it seems like the panel's
opinion allows states to grant parents the right to compel their children's
speech. This Note argues that this is an improper interpretation of the
Winn opinion.
When the panel discusses the parents' rights, the panel outlines the
statute's legitimate sweep. Remember, courts will uphold an overbreadth
challenge only if a statute's overbreadth substantially outweighs the stat-
ute's legitimate sweep.2 °5 Hence, the panel never declared that a parent's
right to raise his child outweighs a child's freedom of speech; the panel
declared that a legislature may decide the default rule that generally gov-
erns. Here, the state has created a mechanism (pledging) that might put a
child's right (the right to conscientiously not pledge) against the right of
the child's parent (to make the child pledge if the child cannot make
conscientious decisions about pledging). For efficiency reasons, the leg-
islature can pick a default rule.
Some language in the panel's decision bolsters this interpretation.
"The rights of students and the rights of parents-two different sets of
persons whose opinions can often clash-are the subject of a legislative
201. Id.
202. 535 F.3d 1279 (11th Cir. 2008), reh'g en banc denied, 555 F.3d 1292 (11th Cir. 2009).
203. Id. at 1285.
204. Id.
205. E.g., Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615 (1973).
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balance in the statute before US." ' 2 06 Importantly, a student and his par-
ents may agree on whether to pledge allegiance. Here, the panel found
the statute legitimate, declaring, "The State, in restricting the student's
freedom of speech, advances the protection of the constitutional rights of
parents: an interest which the State may lawfully protect.'' 2°7 Parents do
not have a right that trumps their children's rights. Still, when two rights
generally supplement each other and only occasionally conflict, the leg-
islature may assume the supplementation as the default rule.
The Eleventh Circuit's precedent undermines any view that the
court disregards children's First Amendment rights. Indeed, the Eleventh
Circuit has protected students' freedom of speech. The court has even
protected students who refused to pledge. For example, in Holloman v.
Harland, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals stated, "Barnette clearly
and specifically established that schoolchildren have the right to refuse
to say the Pledge of Allegiance. '20 8 And the court held that a student
whom a school punished for refusing to recite the Pledge of Allegiance
"articulated a violation of his First Amendment right to freedom of
expression. 2 °9
Despite Holloman's assurance that the Eleventh Circuit respects
students' rights, Winn appears to backtrack. But this backtracking
reflects a lack of clarity in the Winn opinion, not a rejection of Hollo-
man. The panel barely mentions the overbreadth standard,210 and the
panel simply concludes that the student did not persuade the panel "that
the balance favors students in a substantial number of instances."21
But this lack of clarity does not mean the panel erred. The panel
just failed to explicate its decision. As explained above, the panel held
that the statute legitimately defended parents' fundamental right to raise
children. For the panel, this "legitimate sweep" greatly outweighed any
overbreadth. Only one sentence in the opinion depicts this overbreadth
balance, but this sentence exists.
This important sentence states,
Even if the balance of parental, student, and school rights might favor
the rights of a mature high school student in a specific instance,
Plaintiff has not persuaded us that the balance favors students in a
substantial number of instances-particularly those instances involv-
ing elementary and middle school students-relative to the total
206. Winn, 535 F.3d at 1284.
207. Id. (emphasis added).
208. 370 F.3d 1252, 1269 (11 th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted).
209. Id. at 1277.
210. Winn, 535 F.3d at 1283-84.
211. Id. at 1285.
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number of students covered by the statute. 1l
This sentence contains the entire overbreadth analysis. First, the panel
recognizes that the statute possibly infringes the rights of mature high-
school students. Second, the panel implies that middle-school and ele-
mentary-school students lack the maturity to conscientiously reject
pledging. The panel makes numerous assumptions here.
The panel assumes that certain children have no First Amendment
rights. Some truth underlies this assumption. No one would argue that an
average eight-year-old student could overrule her parents' decision that
she recite the Pledge of Allegiance. For an average eight-year-old would
not refuse to pledge for conscientious reasons. Instead, the average
eight-year-old is likely acting rowdy for other reasons. And, although
the panel agrees that high-school students have the maturity to protest
the Pledge, the panel also assumes that only a handful of high-school
students would both refuse to recite the Pledge and have parents that
refuse to waive the recitation. For the panel, the small number of high-
school students who must recite the Pledge against their wills doesn't
substantially outnumber the instances where parents have the right to tell
an unruly minor child to pledge allegiance or where parents and student
agree on whether to recite the Pledge.
As a matter of common sense, the panel's sum and balance seems
correct. Few minors would refuse to recite the Pledge and have their
parents force them to. This number of these students is likely no greater
than the number of children who refuse to recite the Pledge because they
want to disobey their parents or authorities. In the vast majority of cases,
both parents and child agree on whether to pledge. Still, the panel could
have explicated and expanded its analysis. That would have alleviated
the confusion the opinion creates.
While this explanation of the panel's opinion creates harmony, the
panel's opinion ignored some major issues. For example, the panel never
decided when students have the maturity to claim this First Amendment
right. The panel implied that, generally, high-school students have the
maturity to conscientiously refuse to pledge, but the panel never tackled
the issue. This issue seems critical. If the court erred and even eight-
year-olds can conscientiously object, then the chilling effect influences a
larger number of students. 2 3 Thus, the law's chilling effect might sub-
stantially outweigh the law's legitimate sweep.
Yet, an easy explanation to the panel's avoidance exists. The panel
212. Id.
213. And, indeed, some courts have found First Amendment violations of even young children.
See, e.g., Rabideau v. Beekmantown Cent. Sch. Dist., 89 F. Supp. 2d 263, 264, 267 (N.D.N.Y.
2000) (nine-year-old).
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believes that parents and children almost always agree, regardless of
when students have First Amendment rights. Under this view, the outli-
ers cannot substantially outweigh the legitimate norm.
Judge Barkett highlighted another issue ignored by the panel in her
dissent from denial of rehearing en banc. For Judge Barkett, the panel
erred in applying the overbreadth doctrine instead of strict scrutiny
because "[t]his statute is not prohibiting speech; it is compelling speech
against one's conscience. ' 1214 The panel never mentioned this distinction
or its result on the "chilling effect" purpose of the overbreadth doctrine.
Here, the statute compels speech-the pledging of allegiance. Since
the government compels speech, the "chilling effect" becomes more
powerful than in most other cases. Because the statute compels speech,
someone who disagrees has two options: They must speak or remain
silent. In choosing to remain silent, the individual's abstention becomes
obvious. In contrast, a law that prohibits speech broadly does not guar-
antee that the government will punish the protected speech. Instead, the
"chill" only implies that some citizens might stop their protected speech
for fear of retribution. When the government compels speech, the citizen
knows that her noncompliance demands punishment. Moreover, the
compelled speech here occurs in front of governmental officials. This
expands the chilling effect. Thus, Judge Barkett validly criticized the
panel's use of overbreadth.
Yet, never did the panel acknowledge this distinction. Why? One
suggestion exists. On appeal, Frazier never argued that the compelled-
speech doctrine made this law unconstitutional. Certainly, Frazier
argued that Florida granted parents a power it lacked-to compel stu-
dents' speech 2 5-but Frazier didn't rely on the compelled-speech doc-
trine to overturn the law. The issue not being before the court, the panel
ignored the issue. Nonetheless, the statute clearly compels speech, and
the opinion never clarified the reason for ignoring this fact. Of all of the
panel's assumptions, this assumption causes the most concern.
The panel in Winn, while implicating some strange views, never did
anything extraordinary. It applied the Broadrick overbreadth test. This
analysis, at least without any data, follows common sense. Nevertheless,
the panel wrote a murky opinion, under which only one sentence actu-
ally accomplishes the Broadrick analysis. Indeed, by failing to cement
its analysis to the overbreadth doctrine, the opinion shockingly implies
that parents can overrule their children's First Amendment rights, so
long as the state allows it. More importantly, the panel never explained
214. Frazier v. Alexandre, 555 F.3d 1292, 1295 (11 th Cir. 2009) (Barkett, J., dissenting).
215. See Answer Brief of Appellee, supra note 135, at 15.
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the relevancy of the statute's compulsion of speech. Thus, while Winn is
not as bizarre as it first seems, it is no champion of clarity.
D. School-Yard Brawl?: A Possible Circuit Split
While the Third Circuit's decision in Circle School v. Pappert2 6
cannot be classified as creating a circuit split with Winn, since the stat-
utes in question are not identical, the decisions arguably conflict. As
previously stated in Part H.B of this Note, both the district court and
Judge Barkett in her dissent for rehearing en banc acknowledged and
relied on the Third Circuit's decision. In Circle School, the court found
unconstitutional a Pennsylvania statute requiring supervising officers of
the school system to send written notification home to the parents of any
student who declined to recite the Pledge of Allegiance or refused not to
salute the flag. 217 The relevant part of this statute states:
Students may decline to recite the Pledge of Allegiance and may
refrain from saluting the flag on the basis of religious conviction or
personal belief. The supervising officer of a school subject to the
requirements of this subsection shall provide written notification to
the parents or guardian of any student who declines to recite the
Pledge of Allegiance or who refrains from saluting the flag.2" 8
A public-school student brought a suit alleging that the parental-notifica-
tion requirement deterred the exercise of his free-expression rights.219
The district court ruled that the parental-notification clause was a
viewpoint-based regulation that operated to chill students' speech.
220
Applying strict scrutiny to the clause, the court determined that the stat-
ute was not narrowly tailored. Furthermore, the court stated that the state
lacked a sufficiently compelling reason for the clause, held the clause to
be unconstitutional, and issued a permanent injunction prohibiting
defendants from enforcing the act.22' It came to this conclusion noting
that the Commonwealth's stated purpose, that the clause "simply serves
an administrative function, designed to efficiently inform all parents of
an aspect of their children's education,' 222 did not suffice as a compel-
ling state interest. The Third Circuit, when reviewing the district court's
opinion, acknowledged that there is a "careful balance between the First
Amendment rights of students and the special needs of the state in ensur-
216. 381 F.3d 172 (3d Cir. 2004).
217. 24 PA. STAT. ANN. § 7-771(c) (West 2003).
218. Id.
219. Circle Sch., 381 F.3d at 176.
220. Circle Sch.v. Phillips, 270 F. Supp. 2d 616, 623-26 (E.D. Pa. 2003), affd sub nom. Circle
Sch., 381 F.3d 172.
221. Id. at 624, 632-34.
222. Circle Sch., 381 F.3d at 179.
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ing proper educational standards and curriculum." '2 23 In doing so, it
obviously recognized that the student, individually, had a First Amend-
ment right. The Commonwealth argued that the ability of the student to
opt out of the Pledge coupled with the parental-notification requirement
together met the balance required by law between the student's right to
freedom of speech and the Commonwealth's and parents' rights.224
Also, the Commonwealth argued that similar provisions have been used
regarding minors' access to abortions.2 25 The court dismissed this argu-
ment, stating that the cases involving a parental notification of a minor's
abortion were decided on due-process grounds and not the First
Amendment.226
The Third Circuit agreed with the district court's opinion that strict
scrutiny must be applied to the clause because it found that the parental-
notification requirement "clearly discriminate[d] among students based
on the viewpoints they express; it [was] only triggered when a student
exercises his or her First Amendment right not to speak. '227 Applying
strict scrutiny, the court held that the Commonwealth's parental-notifi-
cation clause failed to establish a convincing governmental interest.
228
The court therefore found the parental-notification clause
unconstitutional.
While the Pennsylvania and Florida statutes are not identical, they
both similarly involve the notification or the consent of a parent when a
child attempts to exercise his or her First Amendment right by refusing
to recite the Pledge. The decisions of the courts in Circle School, as well
as Judge Barkett's dissent in the denial of a rehearing en banc and the
district court's decision, are at an opposite end of the spectrum from the
Eleventh Circuit's decision in Winn. There are strong arguments that can
be made that these two decisions cannot be distinguished in a way to
reconcile the apparent conflicts. Therefore, a strong need for the
Supreme Court to step in and determine the constitutionality of includ-
ing parents in their child's decision not to recite the Pledge exists.
223. Id. at 178.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 179.
226. Id. The court also underscored that recent cases have only allowed parental-notification
requirements involving a minor's ability to obtain an abortion if ajudicial-bypass mechanism is in
place-that is, where a minor can go to a judge without having to get parental consent. See id.
This is an essential requirement that the Eleventh Circuit failed to acknowledge when citing the
abortion cases, extremely briefly, in a footnote in their Winn decision. See Frazier v. Winn, 535
F.3d 1279, 1285 n.7 (11 th Cir. 2008) (per curiam), reh'g en banc denied, 555 F.3d 1292 (11 th Cir.
2009).
227. Circle Sch., 381 F.3d at 180 (internal quotation marks omitted).




Winn lacks clarity. This lack of clarity creates a riddle, as two inter-
pretations of the court's parental-consent holding form. On one hand, the
court might be saying what its words tell us. Maybe a parent's right to
raise her child as she wants does trump her child's free speech. Maybe
when the court told us that it ignored the as-applied challenge, the court
meant that the district court decided the as-applied challenge incorrectly.
This Note, however, underscores this interpretation's incoherency. Chil-
dren do have rights, and the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, in Hollo-
man, told us so. Hence, this first interpretation seems an improper
interpretation.
Winn contains a second interpretation. Depending on an over-
breadth-challenge standpoint, this interpretation leaves less to be
resolved.
From an overbreadth-challenge standpoint, Winn has merit. In the
real world, the Pledge statute gives us four outcomes. To begin, a parent
and his child might agree on the merits of pledging. In this scenario, the
child happily pledges. Next, a parent and his child might agree on the
meritless nature of pledging. Here, while he sits down, the child nods his
head in disapproval as his classmates pledge. Or, despite his parent's
command, a child might refuse to pledge; but the child refuses for no
conscientious reason. He merely refuses for spite. Finally, a child might
conscientiously disagree with his parent's command. Only this final sce-
nario raises First Amendment issues. Under the second interpretation of
Winn, the court refuses to believe that this last, unconstitutional scenario
substantially outweighs the first three scenarios.
Nevertheless, the court never says this and therefore muddles its
precedence. If all the Eleventh Circuit sought to do was dismiss Fra-
zier's overbreadth claim, and reserve an as-applied challenge for mature,
conscientiously-objecting minors, such an opinion could have been
unambiguous. As a result, district courts may struggle to decipher Winn.
They may take it at face value, and interpret its troublesome language to
essentially leave minors' constitutional rights at the mercy of their par-
ents' decisions.
Additionally, because Frazier's facial challenge was unsuccessful,
every conscientiously objecting minor whose parents disagree with his
abstention will have to bring an independent as-applied challenge to
avoid pledging. It is conceded that these suits surely will not fling open
the floodgates of litigation. However, this places a large administrative
hurdle in front of Florida's minors. Because the Pledge statute provides
for no specific judicial-bypass mechanism similar to that established by
the Parental Notice of Abortion Act, conscientiously objecting minors
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must find an attorney to take their case and pay whatever associated
fees. Surely it's impossible to stretch a weekly allowance that far.
Worse, the court ignores grave details. Critically, the court ignores
that this statute compels speech. The statute's chilling effect cannot
compare to the chilling effect of statutes that prohibit certain speech. By
ignoring this, the Eleventh Circuit forged a tension with the Third Cir-
cuit. Winn and Circle School talk past each other. Will the Supreme
Court scurry to resolve this dispute? Until it does, the lower courts, prac-
titioners, and students must clear the dust and decipher the message.
